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 ﾠ The	 ﾠCopenhagen	 ﾠAccord	 ﾠof	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠpledged	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrich	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ$100	 ﾠ
billion	 ﾠa	 ﾠyear	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2020	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠabatement	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgas	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠin	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠto	 ﾠfacilitate	 ﾠadaptation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠvulnerable	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠchange	 ﾠas	 ﾠwill	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
result	 ﾠof	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠdioxide	 ﾠconcentration	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠatmosphere	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠoccurred,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠfew	 ﾠdecades.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“This	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠsources,	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠprivate,	 ﾠbilateral	 ﾠand	 ﾠmultilateral”	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ“new	 ﾠand	 ﾠadditional.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠaddresses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠhow	 ﾠbest	 ﾠto	 ﾠfinance	 ﾠabatement	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgas	 ﾠ(GHG)	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠworldwide,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
objective	 ﾠof	 ﾠslowing	 ﾠand	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠeven	 ﾠstopping	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld’s	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
expected	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgenerated	 ﾠby	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠof	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠdioxide	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠfossil	 ﾠfuels	 ﾠand	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠland	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠcutting	 ﾠof	 ﾠforests)	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠby	 ﾠother	 ﾠknown	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgases.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ An	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠchange	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠslowed	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠactions	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrich	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠalone,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠfor	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠKyoto	 ﾠProtocol	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1997,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠany	 ﾠcase	 ﾠexpires	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2012.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCurrent	 ﾠprojections,	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠdemonstrated	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠin	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠmodernizing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeconomies,	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2020	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠdioxide	 ﾠ
emissions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfossil	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠalone	 ﾠ(leaving	 ﾠaside	 ﾠother	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠemissions)	 ﾠin	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠwill	 ﾠexceed	 ﾠworldwide	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgas	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1990,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbase	 ﾠyear	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠKyoto	 ﾠProtocol.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠother	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠrich	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnotionally	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠto	 ﾠzero	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2020	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhappen	 ﾠin	 ﾠreality)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠalone	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠemitting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠscale	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
1990.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPut	 ﾠsimply,	 ﾠslowing	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠchange	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactive	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠemitters	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠdrastic	 ﾠaction	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrich	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠalone	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠminimal.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ That	 ﾠdismal	 ﾠreality	 ﾠwas	 ﾠgrudgingly	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCopenhagen	 ﾠAccord	 ﾠand	 ﾠreaffirmed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
following	 ﾠyear	 ﾠat	 ﾠCancun.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠthen	 ﾠriposted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrich	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ




	 ﾠ How	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfinanced?	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠSecretary	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠBan	 ﾠKi-ﾭ‐moon	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠ
Nations	 ﾠconstituted	 ﾠa	 ﾠ20-ﾭ‐member	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠadvisory	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠ(all	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthree	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsitting	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠor	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganizations),	 ﾠco-ﾭ‐chaired	 ﾠby	 ﾠMeles	 ﾠZenawi	 ﾠand	 ﾠJens	 ﾠ
Stoltenberg,	 ﾠprime	 ﾠministers	 ﾠof	 ﾠEthiopia	 ﾠand	 ﾠNorway	 ﾠrespectively.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠreported	 ﾠin	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
made	 ﾠ6-ﾭ‐7	 ﾠsuggestions	 ﾠ(approximate	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠnet	 ﾠflows	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠparentheses):	 ﾠ
1)  Allocate	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ10	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠin	 ﾠrich	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ	 ﾠa	 ﾠ$20-ﾭ‐25	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
ton	 ﾠtax	 ﾠon	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠdioxide-ﾭ‐equivalent	 ﾠemissions,	 ﾠor	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠauctioning	 ﾠ
emission	 ﾠpermits	 ﾠ($30	 ﾠbillion);	 ﾠ
2)  Impose	 ﾠan	 ﾠemission	 ﾠtax	 ﾠon	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠtransportation	 ﾠ(but	 ﾠinsulate	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠits	 ﾠincidence),	 ﾠand	 ﾠallocate	 ﾠ25-ﾭ‐50	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ($10	 ﾠ
billion);	 ﾠ
3)  Redeploy	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfossil	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠsubsidies	 ﾠnow	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠrich	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
or,	 ﾠalternatively,	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠtransactions	 ﾠtax	 ﾠ(up	 ﾠto	 ﾠ$10	 ﾠbillion);	 ﾠ
4)  Expect	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠflows	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$100-ﾭ‐200	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠstimulated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠtax,	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ$10-ﾭ‐20	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreckoned	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnet	 ﾠflows	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries;	 ﾠ
5)  Expect	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠflows	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$30-ﾭ‐50,	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ$10	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnet	 ﾠ
transfers	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries;	 ﾠ
6)  Increase	 ﾠlending	 ﾠby	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠby	 ﾠ$30-ﾭ‐40	 ﾠbillion,	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ$11	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
reckoned	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnet	 ﾠflows.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠsuggestions	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠ$80-ﾭ‐90	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠin	 ﾠnet	 ﾠflows	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠgross	 ﾠflows.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠAdvisory	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠalso	 ﾠexpects	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠbudgetary	 ﾠcontributions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠrich	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠwould	 ﾠplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠconcludes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCopenhagen	 ﾠtarget	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“challenging	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
feasible.”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ One	 ﾠpuzzling	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreport	 ﾠis	 ﾠits	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠon	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠtransfers	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠ
countries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠwell	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠto	 ﾠcalculate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠequivalent,	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠ(maturity,	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠetc.)	 ﾠvary	 ﾠsignificantly,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠmetric	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠby	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠdonors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCopenhagen	 ﾠAccord	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
mention	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠaid,	 ﾠor	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠassistance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“resources”	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“funding,”	 ﾠas	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
challenge	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠin	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
required	 ﾠto	 ﾠmitigate	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgas	 ﾠemissions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAdvisory	 ﾠGroup’s	 ﾠreport	 ﾠon	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠ
equivalents	 ﾠ(apparently	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠof	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGroup)	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠ
yet	 ﾠanother	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠtheme	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠforums	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1960s.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
find	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠupfront	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreaped	 ﾠlater;	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
desire	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠresource	 ﾠtransfers	 ﾠto	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠaugmenting	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠincomes	 ﾠ(some	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
allocated	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvestment).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCopenhagen	 ﾠAccord	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
admittedly	 ﾠunclear;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAdvisory	 ﾠGroup’s	 ﾠReport	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter.	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Grants	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐known	 ﾠproblems.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠsolely	 ﾠdevoted	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
purchases	 ﾠof	 ﾠimported	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠequipment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpurchased,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdistort	 ﾠprices	 ﾠ
domestically	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠinhibit	 ﾠexports	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠso-ﾭ‐called	 ﾠDutch	 ﾠdisease	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠprices	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
tradable	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠand	 ﾠservices	 ﾠare	 ﾠbid	 ﾠup,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠdiscouraging	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexport.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠ
equivalent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$100	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠwould	 ﾠamount	 ﾠto	 ﾠ0.7	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠprojected	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐OECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ(less	 ﾠ
China	 ﾠand	 ﾠRussia)	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2020,	 ﾠand	 ﾠover	 ﾠthree	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠexports	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠso	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
quantitatively	 ﾠsignificant.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠgrants	 ﾠare	 ﾠan	 ﾠinvitation	 ﾠto	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐productive	 ﾠrent-ﾭ‐seeking	 ﾠ
behavior	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecipient	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest,	 ﾠand	 ﾠoutright	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠAdvisory	 ﾠ
Group	 ﾠobserves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠcredibility	 ﾠof…countries…will	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgreatly	 ﾠincreased…if	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠresources	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠspent	 ﾠwisely…and	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠresults.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdisappointingly	 ﾠweak	 ﾠ
statement	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠassure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠCopenhagen	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠare	 ﾠspent	 ﾠproductively	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠintended.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN	 ﾠReport	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠand	 ﾠspecificity	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠreport	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠG20	 ﾠFinance	 ﾠMinisters	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠby	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠ(World	 ﾠBank	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.,	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
report	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠproperly	 ﾠon	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠin	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠand	 ﾠadaptation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠ
“purely	 ﾠillustrative	 ﾠscenarios”	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠsources	 ﾠunder	 ﾠsix	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠheadings	 ﾠ(following	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN	 ﾠreport)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
cumulatively	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠ$186-ﾭ‐413	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2020	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwell	 ﾠin	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCopenhagen/Cancun	 ﾠcommitments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠit	 ﾠalso	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠto	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠin	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠand	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠin	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
developed	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠmany	 ﾠnew	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠHouser	 ﾠand	 ﾠSelfe,	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
problems	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠplaces	 ﾠa	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠon	 ﾠthose	 ﾠscenarios	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠeither	 ﾠcutting	 ﾠ
expenditures	 ﾠ–	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubsidies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠfossil	 ﾠfuels	 ﾠ–	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
raising	 ﾠrevenues,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠon	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgas	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠor	 ﾠauctioning	 ﾠpermits	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
emissions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Like	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCopenhagen	 ﾠcommitment,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN	 ﾠAdvisory	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠBank	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠside;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠproductively	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠattain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
desired	 ﾠobjectives.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠlogical	 ﾠgap	 ﾠis	 ﾠfilled	 ﾠby	 ﾠWilliam	 ﾠCline	 ﾠ(2011),	 ﾠwho	 ﾠaddresses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠin	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCline	 ﾠspecifies	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“business-ﾭ‐as-ﾭ‐usual”	 ﾠemission	 ﾠscenario	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld’s	 ﾠ25	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠemitters	 ﾠto	 ﾠ2050.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHe	 ﾠthen	 ﾠadopts	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotional	 ﾠCopenhagen	 ﾠtarget	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
greenhouse	 ﾠgases	 ﾠ(carbon	 ﾠdioxide	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠequivalents	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠgases)	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexceed	 ﾠ450	 ﾠparts	 ﾠper	 ﾠ
million	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2050,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠof	 ﾠlimiting	 ﾠwarming	 ﾠto	 ﾠ2	 ﾠdegrees	 ﾠcentigrade.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHe	 ﾠpostulates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
emissions	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠthis	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠtarget	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠequalized	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
1.43	 ﾠtons	 ﾠper	 ﾠperson	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2050,	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠview	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠ
condition	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠquestionable	 ﾠif	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠchange	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠundesirable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
implicit	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWithin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠframework	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcalculates	 ﾠemission	 ﾠtrajectories	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
25	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠDrawing	 ﾠon	 ﾠcost	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠsources,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠattaining	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
trajectories,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠwith	 ﾠand	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐border	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠof	 ﾠemission	 ﾠrights.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHis	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠannual	 ﾠcost	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeconomically	 ﾠmanageable,	 ﾠrising	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ.22-ﾭ‐1.33	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠgross	 ﾠworld	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
2030,	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠused,	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1.15-ﾭ‐2.92	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2050.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠCross-ﾭ‐border	 ﾠsales	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
emission	 ﾠrights	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠcost,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠby	 ﾠsurprisingly	 ﾠlittle.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠtranslates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠtrajectory	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
investment	 ﾠrequirements,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfollowed	 ﾠby	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠin	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠsaving,	 ﾠand	 ﾠconcludes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
developing	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ(less	 ﾠChina)	 ﾠcould	 ﾠproductively	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ$41	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠannually	 ﾠfor	 ﾠabatement	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2020,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
China	 ﾠalone	 ﾠcould	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ$53	 ﾠbillion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠfinancing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAdaptation	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠadd	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠ$40	 ﾠbillion,	 ﾠplacing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$81	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ$100	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ
target.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Both	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN	 ﾠreport	 ﾠand	 ﾠCline’s	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠneglect	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠin	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠ
mitigation	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgas	 ﾠemissions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfeasible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠto	 ﾠcover	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
appropriate	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbudgets,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠeverywhere	 ﾠare	 ﾠstrained	 ﾠthanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
crisis	 ﾠand	 ﾠrecession	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2008-ﾭ‐2009.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠon	 ﾠemitting	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠturn	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠpass	 ﾠthem	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠcustomers	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠbusiness.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
jurisdictions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠgain	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠ
advantage	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠin	 ﾠjurisdictions	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdo	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcosts,	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠGHG	 ﾠ
emissions	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠor	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠfor	 ﾠemission	 ﾠpermits	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpurchased.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOver	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠother	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠpermitting,	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrelocate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠjurisdictions	 ﾠimposing	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
jurisdictions	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcosts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠintolerable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost-ﾭ‐
imposing	 ﾠjurisdictions;	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠalso	 ﾠweaken	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffectiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠarrangement,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠGHG	 ﾠ
emissions	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠrelocated	 ﾠgeographically	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠenforcement	 ﾠis	 ﾠweak	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠis	 ﾠendeminc.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAny	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthis	 ﾠissue	 ﾠsquarely	 ﾠis	 ﾠbound	 ﾠto	 ﾠfail.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ
approximation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpossibly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠallowance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠtiming,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠGHG	 ﾠ
mitigation	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠcompeting	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠwherever	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠlocated.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCopenhagen	 ﾠ
Accord	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠissue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUN	 ﾠAdvisory	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠalso	 ﾠignores	 ﾠit,	 ﾠimplicitly	 ﾠ
assuming	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrelieved	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠmitigating	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠemissions,	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠborne	 ﾠby	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠresource	 ﾠtransfers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCline	 ﾠalso	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthis	 ﾠissue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠYet	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠto	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠa	 ﾠviable	 ﾠsolution.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠissue	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠhypothetical.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠ
relocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld’s	 ﾠsteel	 ﾠindustry,	 ﾠto	 ﾠChina.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsteel,	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠ
steel	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠwas	 ﾠgreatly	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠof	 ﾠcheap	 ﾠloans	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠbanks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Extensive	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot-ﾭ‐well-ﾭ‐coordinated	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠin	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠcapacity,	 ﾠaggravated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠ
slowdown	 ﾠin	 ﾠworld	 ﾠdemand,	 ﾠand	 ﾠChina	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠexporter	 ﾠof	 ﾠsteel	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠenergy-ﾭ‐
using	 ﾠindustry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠhave	 ﾠprotected	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsteel	 ﾠindustries	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠ
emission	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠby	 ﾠallocating	 ﾠfree	 ﾠemission	 ﾠpermits	 ﾠfar	 ﾠin	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠof	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠ
thus	 ﾠin	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemission	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubsidize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠsome	 ﾠother)	 ﾠindustry,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
excess	 ﾠpermits	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsold	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ(Cooper,	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ	 ﾠOther	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠ
States,	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠduties	 ﾠon	 ﾠsome	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠsteel	 ﾠproducts.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠphenomenon	 ﾠwould	 ﾠarise	 ﾠif	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠused	 ﾠ
government-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠtransfers	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubsidize	 ﾠor	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠenterprises,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠand	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠmarkets;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠextends	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠto	 ﾠputting	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠwishing	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠin	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠdisadvantage,	 ﾠe.g.	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠfacilities	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
infrastructure,	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠin	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠand	 ﾠdevelopment.	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠshort,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠis	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠat	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpoorly	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
global	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgases	 ﾠ(Frankel,	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠCountries	 ﾠwill	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠindustries	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ“unfair”	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠincur	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgas	 ﾠ
emissions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEstimating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠimport	 ﾠduties	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
electricity	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠattribute	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠ(Houser,	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
inevitably	 ﾠtranslate	 ﾠinto	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountervailing	 ﾠduties,	 ﾠand	 ﾠones	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠwill	 ﾠerr	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
high	 ﾠside.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Of	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠduties	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexports,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠsales	 ﾠin	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
imports;	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠfraction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠwould	 ﾠfall	 ﾠon	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐tradable	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠand	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠas	 ﾠelectricity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlighting	 ﾠof	 ﾠbuildings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ There	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠa	 ﾠstraight-ﾭ‐forward	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠjoint	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠ
greenhouse	 ﾠgas	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠdistorting	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠinvestment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠevery	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠon	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgas	 ﾠemissions,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠdioxide	 ﾠderived	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠfossil	 ﾠfuels.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠmatter,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠall	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠneed	 ﾠbe	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠinitially;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠall	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
reasonably	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐developed	 ﾠindustrial	 ﾠbase,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠeither	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠor	 ﾠcould	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnear	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠemissions,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠto	 ﾠinhibit	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠarbitrage.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠin	 ﾠAnnex	 ﾠB	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠKyoto	 ﾠProtocol,	 ﾠ
above	 ﾠall	 ﾠChina	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠChile,	 ﾠMexico,	 ﾠSouth	 ﾠKorea,	 ﾠTurkey	 ﾠ(all	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOECD),	 ﾠArgentina,	 ﾠBrazil,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
India,	 ﾠIndonesia,	 ﾠIran,	 ﾠPakistan,	 ﾠMalaysia,	 ﾠThailand,	 ﾠSouth	 ﾠAfrica,	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠothers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠuniform,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrief	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠno	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfive	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbe	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRevenues	 ﾠwould	 ﾠaccrue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠlevying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
charges,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfree	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠarrangement,	 ﾠviz.	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscourage	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemission	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgases.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMinisters	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinance	 ﾠeverywhere	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠwelcome	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew,	 ﾠinternationally	 ﾠsanctioned	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠrevenue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMost	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
world	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠare	 ﾠstrapped	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrevenue,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠexception	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠrely	 ﾠ
heavily	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexport	 ﾠof	 ﾠoil	 ﾠor	 ﾠgas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠrevenues.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
doubt	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdevote	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠa	 ﾠportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠ
deficits	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠborrow	 ﾠto	 ﾠcover	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdeficits.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdevoted	 ﾠto	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠtaxes,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
cushion	 ﾠthose	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠor	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwere	 ﾠhurt	 ﾠexceptionally	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintroduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠ
proposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠMetcalf).	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdevoted	 ﾠto	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠand	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠinto	 ﾠways	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠ
substitute	 ﾠsources	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfossil	 ﾠfuels	 ﾠ(“renewables,”	 ﾠinterpreted	 ﾠbroadly)	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠconserve	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠ
cutting	 ﾠback	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠallocated	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelping	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠvulnerable	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠadapt	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠchange	 ﾠas	 ﾠoccurs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠemitting	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠ
anywhere,	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠor	 ﾠprivate,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprotected	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠits	 ﾠemissions.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Some	 ﾠwill	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠarrangement	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinequitable,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠfall	 ﾠon	 ﾠrich	 ﾠand	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠalike.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠso	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠconsume	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcarbon-ﾭ‐
intensive	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpay	 ﾠproportionately	 ﾠmore.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠanalogy	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhelpful.	 ﾠ	 ﾠToday	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠpays	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfull	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠscarce	 ﾠmineral	 ﾠresources,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠoil	 ﾠor	 ﾠcopper.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdiscriminate	 ﾠ6	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠrich	 ﾠand	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠscarce	 ﾠresources;	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoor,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠall,	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠways,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtax	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠor	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠservices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠon	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠ
change	 ﾠpresupposes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnow	 ﾠrealize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠatmosphere	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠa	 ﾠscarce	 ﾠresource,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
comes	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisposing	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgases	 ﾠin	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠLike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠcopper,	 ﾠits	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠis	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
additional	 ﾠemissions,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠby	 ﾠrich	 ﾠor	 ﾠby	 ﾠpoor.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠuse,	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
discourage	 ﾠits	 ﾠuse	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmedium	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisposal	 ﾠby	 ﾠeveryone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠcentral,	 ﾠand	 ﾠlegitimate,	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠactions	 ﾠto	 ﾠmitigate	 ﾠ
climate	 ﾠchange	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcompromise	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpath	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelopment,	 ﾠor	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
growth.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠassumed,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠraising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
fossil	 ﾠfuels)	 ﾠto	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwill	 ﾠslow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠgrowth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcircumstances,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcorrect.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠcan	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠfour	 ﾠchannels	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpermanent	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠprices	 ﾠof	 ﾠfossil	 ﾠfuels	 ﾠmight	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrowth:	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
direct	 ﾠinput	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduction;	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcharge;	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠ
goods	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠinvestment;	 ﾠand	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠcompetitiveness	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠhence	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠon	 ﾠexport	 ﾠgrowth.	 ﾠ
Economic	 ﾠGrowth	 ﾠ
Energy	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠkey	 ﾠinput	 ﾠto	 ﾠmany	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠeconomies,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠagriculture.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSurely	 ﾠraising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdiscourage	 ﾠproduction?	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
reasons	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠis	 ﾠused	 ﾠvery	 ﾠinefficiently	 ﾠin	 ﾠChina,	 ﾠIndia,	 ﾠand	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠmany	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠactual	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠin	 ﾠrich	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠexists	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠ
input	 ﾠof	 ﾠenergy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSometimes	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchange	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠan	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠincentive,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠ
prices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSometimes	 ﾠit	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠan	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠplus	 ﾠnew	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠabout	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSometimes	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
requires	 ﾠan	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠplus	 ﾠnew	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠenergy-ﾭ‐efficient	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠor	 ﾠequipment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
course	 ﾠnew	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠfunding.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdiverted	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠother	 ﾠdestinations	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
energy	 ﾠsaving,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠlower	 ﾠgrowth.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnoteworthy,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠenergy-ﾭ‐saving	 ﾠ
investments	 ﾠwould	 ﾠyield	 ﾠhandsome	 ﾠrates	 ﾠof	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠif	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠprices	 ﾠwere	 ﾠhigher.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠ7	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠmust	 ﾠmake	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠin	 ﾠpower	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠ
aspirations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimproved,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreduced,	 ﾠ
releasing	 ﾠboth	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠand	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠelsewhere	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomy,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcontributing	 ﾠto	 ﾠgrowth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠestimate,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠChina	 ﾠmust	 ﾠspend	 ﾠan	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$67	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠa	 ﾠyear	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ2001-ﾭ‐
2030,	 ﾠover	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP,	 ﾠto	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠits	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠfor	 ﾠelectricity	 ﾠ(IEA,	 ﾠ2003,	 ﾠp.353).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Even	 ﾠsaving	 ﾠten	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠleave	 ﾠ$7	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠa	 ﾠyear	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠactivities.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠwill	 ﾠraise	 ﾠrevenue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHow	 ﾠthose	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠare	 ﾠused	 ﾠcan	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrowth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠreplace	 ﾠgrowth-ﾭ‐inhibiting	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠon	 ﾠcapital,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnet	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccelerate	 ﾠgrowth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimulations	 ﾠby	 ﾠHo	 ﾠand	 ﾠJorgenson	 ﾠ(2007,	 ﾠp.357)	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
actually	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcharge,	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠother	 ﾠtaxes,	 ﾠthan	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
charge	 ﾠ–	 ﾠi.e.,	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ(modestly)	 ﾠstimulated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
If,	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠare	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠfinance	 ﾠ
expenditures,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmagnitude	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowth-ﾭ‐enhancing	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠexpenditures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠExpenditures	 ﾠon	 ﾠtransport	 ﾠinfrastructure	 ﾠwill	 ﾠpresumably	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠgrowth,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠexpenditures	 ﾠon	 ﾠunder-ﾭ‐funded	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠand	 ﾠdissemination,	 ﾠor	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Expenditures	 ﾠon	 ﾠenlarging	 ﾠor	 ﾠmodernizing	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠforces,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
growth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠeach	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠover	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠenhancement	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrowth.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠthird	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠon	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠgoods,	 ﾠhence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
real	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠnominal	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRaising	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠgoods,	 ﾠother	 ﾠthings	 ﾠequal,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠgrowth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRaising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠin	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠcontent,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠsteel	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcement.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠintensive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ8	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
energy	 ﾠprice	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠon	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠprices	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmitigated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent,	 ﾠper	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠ
above,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠproducers	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠused	 ﾠenergy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠeven	 ﾠconceivable	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠprices	 ﾠwould	 ﾠfall,	 ﾠas	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠimprovements	 ﾠ
outweighed	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠprices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠlong	 ﾠrun	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠchange	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
expected,	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast,	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprices	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠgoods.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠno	 ﾠsecular	 ﾠdecline	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠin	 ﾠrich	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtechnological	 ﾠ
frontier,	 ﾠas	 ﾠcapital-ﾭ‐saving	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠchange	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcompensated	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeclining	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠflow	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtremendous	 ﾠaccumulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠ
during	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠcentury.	 ﾠ
Finally,	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠprices,	 ﾠother	 ﾠthings	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠequal,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠenergy-ﾭ‐
intensive	 ﾠproducts,	 ﾠhence	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompetitiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠon	 ﾠworld	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠserious	 ﾠ
loss	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompetitiveness	 ﾠcould,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠchannels,	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠgrowth.	 ﾠ
Here	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠany	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠimposes	 ﾠa	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
play.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠall	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwould	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcharge,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
competitiveness	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠneutralized	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEnergy-ﾭ‐intensive	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsee	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
rise	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠprice	 ﾠeverywhere,	 ﾠso	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdiscouraged,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
specialized	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexport	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠwould	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠan	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexports.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠno	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠgain	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠin	 ﾠcompetitiveness	 ﾠproduct-ﾭ‐by-ﾭ‐product	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpense	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠ
insofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsuperior	 ﾠat	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexports,	 ﾠor	 ﾠat	 ﾠsubstituting	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
energy	 ﾠsources	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcarbon-ﾭ‐emitting	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠenergy.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠon	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected,	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠto	 ﾠstimulate	 ﾠnew	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠon	 ﾠmethods	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠenergy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠpredict	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠand	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠtechnology,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠ
impetus	 ﾠto	 ﾠgrowth.	 ﾠ
Revenues	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccrue	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠon	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgas	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠwill	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
course	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠboth	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmagnitude	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharge.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠEnergy	 ﾠ
Information	 ﾠAdministration	 ﾠhas	 ﾠprojected	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠdioxide	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠburning	 ﾠfossil	 ﾠfuels	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
2020,	 ﾠreported	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠregional	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠ
sectoral	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠfor	 ﾠenergy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠmix	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠ(EIA	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠLet	 ﾠ
us	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$25	 ﾠa	 ﾠton	 ﾠof	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠworldwide	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2020.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(This	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
similar	 ﾠin	 ﾠnominal	 ﾠterms	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
crisis	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠrecession;	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠa	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠof	 ﾠA$23	 ﾠa	 ﾠton,	 ﾠscheduled	 ﾠto	 ﾠrise	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠ2.5	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠa	 ﾠyear	 ﾠfor	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠyears.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ1	 ﾠreports	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠ
allowing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcharge,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠan	 ﾠupper	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
revenues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgenerated,	 ﾠin	 ﾠUS	 ﾠdollars	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠgross	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠused	 ﾠby	 ﾠEIA	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
making	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprojections	 ﾠof	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠdemands.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ$880	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠearned	 ﾠ
worldwide.	 ﾠChina	 ﾠwould	 ﾠraise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreatest	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠrevenue,	 ﾠat	 ﾠ$252	 ﾠbillion,	 ﾠreflecting	 ﾠits	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠ
emissions	 ﾠof	 ﾠCO2,	 ﾠfollowed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠat	 ﾠ$145	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠand	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠat	 ﾠ$102	 ﾠbillion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ$332	 ﾠ
billion	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠraised	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOrganization	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Development	 ﾠ(OECD),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠAnnex	 ﾠB	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠChile,	 ﾠMexico,	 ﾠSouth	 ﾠKorea,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Turkey.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnnex	 ﾠB	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐OECD	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠRussia	 ﾠand	 ﾠUkraine.	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ
Emissions	 ﾠand	 ﾠRevenues	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2020	 ﾠ10	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ CO2	 ﾠEmissions	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Revenues	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ (billion	 ﾠmetric	 ﾠtons)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ ($	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ (percent	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP)	 ﾠ
USA	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 5.8	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 145	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 0.8	 ﾠ
OECD	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.1	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 102.5	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 0.5	 ﾠ
Japan	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 1.1	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 27.5	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 0.5	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 13.3	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 332.5	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 0.7	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
China	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 10.1	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 252.5	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 2.6	 ﾠ
India	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 2.1	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 52.5	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 2.2	 ﾠ
Brazil	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 0.6	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 0.8	 ﾠ
Russia	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 1.6	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 40	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 3.3	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐OECD	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ22	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 550	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 2.2	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
World	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 35.2	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 880	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 1.2	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠEIA	 ﾠ2011;	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠaugmented	 ﾠby	 ﾠ30	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ2005-ﾭ‐2011	 ﾠ
currency	 ﾠappreciation;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠtext.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠwould	 ﾠamount	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1.2	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠgross	 ﾠworld	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠ(GWP)	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠ
somewhat	 ﾠless	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠabout	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐OECD	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠ3.3	 ﾠ
percent,	 ﾠRussia	 ﾠregisters	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhighest	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠlisted,	 ﾠfollowed	 ﾠby	 ﾠChina	 ﾠat	 ﾠ2.6	 ﾠ
percent.	 ﾠRevenues	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠlimiting	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠemissions;	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠraised.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ11	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠEIA	 ﾠprojections	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠprices	 ﾠand	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrates	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠadjusted	 ﾠhere	 ﾠfor	 ﾠappreciation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠyuan	 ﾠby	 ﾠ30	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFurther	 ﾠappreciation	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠduring	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdecade	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010s,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ2020.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠalso	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsome	 ﾠreal	 ﾠappreciation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIndian	 ﾠrupee	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBrazilian	 ﾠreal	 ﾠ
during	 ﾠthis	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠother	 ﾠcurrencies	 ﾠin	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠrapidly,	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
well-ﾭ‐established	 ﾠpattern.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠprices	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠrisen	 ﾠeverywhere	 ﾠabove	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2005.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠgross	 ﾠ
world	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠ(measured	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2020	 ﾠdollars)	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthat	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEIA,	 ﾠand	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorrespondingly	 ﾠlower	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠGWP	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐OECD	 ﾠGDP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠworld	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠaverages	 ﾠ3	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠ(EIA’s	 ﾠprice	 ﾠyear)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2020,	 ﾠGWP	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ55	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠ
higher	 ﾠin	 ﾠnominal	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠand	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ0.8	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2020	 ﾠGWP.	 ﾠAn	 ﾠannual	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠ
inflation	 ﾠin	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠfour	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠin	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐OECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwould	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthose	 ﾠpercentages	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
0.5	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1.2	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠrespectively.	 ﾠAlternatively,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠraised	 ﾠto	 ﾠ$39	 ﾠa	 ﾠton	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
CO2,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠrestore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentages	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ1	 ﾠafter	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ3	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠannual	 ﾠinflation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Behavioral	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠamong	 ﾠother	 ﾠthings	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠadvance	 ﾠnotice	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
decision-ﾭ‐makers	 ﾠhad	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcharge,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhad	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
CO2-ﾭ‐emitting	 ﾠfossil	 ﾠfuels,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠopportunities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmagnitude	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
behavioral	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠCline	 ﾠ(40,	 ﾠ60),	 ﾠwho	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Europe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠby	 ﾠ17	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2020	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemission	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠimplicit	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCopenhagen	 ﾠconsensus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwill	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠshadow	 ﾠprice	 ﾠper	 ﾠton	 ﾠof	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$19	 ﾠa	 ﾠton	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2020	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
United	 ﾠStates	 ﾠand	 ﾠ$26	 ﾠa	 ﾠton	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠprices	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2020,	 ﾠassuming	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ3	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠa	 ﾠyear	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
2005),	 ﾠand	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠrise	 ﾠthereafter	 ﾠto	 ﾠ$121	 ﾠand	 ﾠ$159,	 ﾠrespectively,	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2030	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠnominal	 ﾠdollars).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Because	 ﾠCline	 ﾠallows	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdelay	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠactions,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠis	 ﾠzero	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ2020,	 ﾠrising	 ﾠto	 ﾠ$119	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2030	 ﾠfor	 ﾠChina,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdecline	 ﾠof	 ﾠ17	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠrough	 ﾠindictor	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠearly	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐announced	 ﾠintroduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
carbon	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorder	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$20-ﾭ‐25.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2020	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
presented	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠlot	 ﾠlower.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠIEA	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠ$10.5	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvested	 ﾠglobally	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠ
sector	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠ2010-ﾭ‐2030	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠviable	 ﾠpath	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstabilizing	 ﾠatmospheric	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠ
concentration	 ﾠat	 ﾠ450	 ﾠppm,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠas	 ﾠCline’s	 ﾠtarget.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠ$8.6	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrecouped	 ﾠin	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠ12	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
saving,	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnet	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠabatement	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$1.9	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠover	 ﾠthis	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfigures	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinferred	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠto	 ﾠultimate	 ﾠabatement	 ﾠcost	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠfive	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
one.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠCline	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinference	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠincorrect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠenlarges	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠ
stock,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservices	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenlarged	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠstock	 ﾠ(after	 ﾠallowance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdepreciation)	 ﾠpersist	 ﾠyear	 ﾠ
after	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠafter	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠthe	 ﾠon-ﾭ‐going	 ﾠannual	 ﾠincremental	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsmaller,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlarger,	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabatement	 ﾠcosts.	 ﾠ
Conclusion	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgas	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtreated	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
doing	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠeverywhere,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠpurchasing	 ﾠcopper	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠinputs	 ﾠinto	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcost	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠbusiness.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEveryone	 ﾠshould	 ﾠpay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠprice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsignal	 ﾠto	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
cost	 ﾠto	 ﾠemitting	 ﾠgreenhouse	 ﾠgases.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPrices	 ﾠsignal	 ﾠscarcity	 ﾠvalue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOtherwise	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseriously	 ﾠdistorted	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwill	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
weaken	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠto	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠconcentrations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠatmosphere	 ﾠby	 ﾠshifting	 ﾠemitting	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
jurisdictions	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠemissions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠbusiness.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcalculations	 ﾠof	 ﾠWilliam	 ﾠCline,	 ﾠan	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠof	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ$25	 ﾠper	 ﾠemitted	 ﾠton	 ﾠof	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
2020,	 ﾠrising	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠto	 ﾠcover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠabatement	 ﾠ
required	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2050	 ﾠto	 ﾠconverge	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠatmospheric	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠconcentration	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ450	 ﾠparts	 ﾠper	 ﾠmillion,	 ﾠ
thought	 ﾠ(admittedly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠuncertainty)	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠwarming	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearth’s	 ﾠsurface	 ﾠto	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ
degrees	 ﾠcentigrade.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠwere	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠeverywhere,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdistort	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
investment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠit	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠgrowth,	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠ
although	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠrequiring	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠsteel,	 ﾠcement,	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐energy	 ﾠusing	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠmore	 ﾠexpensive.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Where	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠleave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpledge	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$100	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠa	 ﾠyear	 ﾠby	 ﾠrich	 ﾠto	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠcountries?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠfor	 ﾠabatement	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠgiven.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
certainly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadaptation	 ﾠin	 ﾠvulnerable	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠchange	 ﾠas	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠCline’s	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠalone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠundertake	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠand	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠinto	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠconservation	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐emitting	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠenergy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠof	 ﾠpilot	 ﾠplants	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠand	 ﾠstorage	 ﾠ(CCS),	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpermit	 ﾠmore	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠcoal,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠand	 ﾠprospective	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠCO2	 ﾠ
emissions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠCCS	 ﾠis	 ﾠtechnically	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomically	 ﾠfeasible	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠscale	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
seriously	 ﾠinadequate;	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexperimenting	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnew	 ﾠcoal	 ﾠplants	 ﾠin	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ
capture	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠless	 ﾠexpensive	 ﾠif	 ﾠplanned	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠproject	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
retrofitting	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠplants.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠfor	 ﾠanything	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdistort	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠ
costs	 ﾠand	 ﾠprices	 ﾠof	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠand	 ﾠsold	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
i	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ$100	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2020	 ﾠis	 ﾠmarkedly	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsome	 ﾠother	 ﾠfigures	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmentioned.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠ
Jacoby	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.,	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠtarget	 ﾠtrajectory	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠ450	 ﾠppm	 ﾠCO2-ﾭ‐equivalent,	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠsimulations	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMIT	 ﾠ
energy-ﾭ‐climate	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠtransfers	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2020	 ﾠof	 ﾠover	 ﾠ$400	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcompensated	 ﾠin	 ﾠfull	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠmitigating	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠchange.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠfigure,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠ
compensation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadverse	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠcomponent	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecline	 ﾠin	 ﾠoil	 ﾠprices	 ﾠfor	 ﾠOPEC	 ﾠexporters,	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill,	 ﾠto	 ﾠput	 ﾠit	 ﾠmildly,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠto	 ﾠlegislatures	 ﾠin	 ﾠoil-ﾭ‐
importing	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ